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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the impact of Brexit on young people aged 12-18 who had moved to Scotland 
from Central and Eastern Europe. It draws on empirical data collected with over 250 young people 
who contributed to an online survey and focus groups between 2016-2018, immediately after the 
Brexit referendum took place. The paper examines young people’s feelings of national identity and 
how their sense of belonging has been impacted by Brexit. The key findings reveal that factors such 
as their everyday experiences of racism and xenophobia and perceptions of what other people, often 
their friends, might think about who gets to belong were identified as significant to the identities young 
migrants felt able to claim. While many young people expressed a strong sense of belonging in the 
UK as a whole and over half said they were feeling Scottish, access to a Scottish national identity 
seems to be restricted and often denied to them. At the same time, many felt able to occupy the 
national identity of their country of birth or claim hyphenated identities that included Scottishness and 
a European identity. In the context of Brexit, this poses a challenge for making New Scots feel like 
they belong in Scotland, as many may now decide to review their plans to remain in Scotland long-
term if their rights change.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The issue of immigration has become increasingly politicised since the Brexit Referendum in 2016, 
although many have argued that the Holyrood Government has managed to promote a more 
welcoming and inclusive discourse north of the border (Hepburn and Rosie, 2014). Over the last two 
decades, the Scottish Government’s stance on immigration has been one of openness and 
recognition of its financial and demographic benefits, with ‘New Scots’ seen as part of an inclusive 
Scottish national identity (Devine and McCarty, 2018). Political leaders such as Nicola Sturgeon have 
spoken openly about support for migrants to settle in Scotland and the Government’s intention to 
continue to campaign for devolved immigration powers, to allow Scotland to implement an immigration 
policy better suited for its economic needs. Some assume this would likely be a less restrictive 
immigration policy than the rest of the United Kingdom, to help address Scotland’s demographic 
challenges (McCollum et al., 2014). This inevitably has been contrasted with political discourses at 
Westminster and the debates which led to the Brexit Referendum, where successive Government 
leaders have pledged to reduce net migration and immigration debates have taken place in often 
alarmist and pejorative terms of ‘threats’ immigrants pose to jobs, public services, crime rates and 
community cohesion.  
Immigration was a significant factor in the 2016 EU Referendum and a key issue during the Brexit 
debate. The popular slogan of the Brexit campaign - ‘Take back control’- was seen some voters as 
meaning more control over immigration and borders and restricting freedom of movement from the 
EU countries. Evidence shows that levels of opposition to migration remain high and less than 1 in 5 
people would want an increase in immigration numbers, although a recent softening in attitudes has 
been reported (Blinder and Richards, 2020). While in 2015/16 immigration was perceived to be ‘one 
of the most important issues’ facing the British public by 48% respondents, by 2020, the public 
became more concerned about ‘health’ (66%) and ‘the economy’ (57%) as the Covid-19 pandemic 
unravelled and immigration was mentioned by only 16% of the people surveyed (YouGov, 2020). 
Public attitudes to immigration in Scotland have been described anecdotally as less hostile than 
elsewhere in the UK, perhaps due to a combination of positive political discourses, a reliance on 
immigration for population growth and relatively low immigration levels. Yet, these attitudes are not 
too different from those in England and Wales, suggesting a disjunction between the pro-migration 
political rhetoric and anti-immigration sentiments at population level. While far more people in 
Scotland think that immigration is good for the economy (46%) than those who think it is bad (17%), 
the figures are similar with views expressed in other regions of the UK (Curtice and Montagu, 2017).  
In a 2013 survey, close to half of people surveyed in Scotland saw increased numbers of ethnic 
minority groups as a threat to Scotland’s identity (Scottish Social Attitudes, 2013). At the same time, 
a majority result of Remain votes in the EU Referendum (at 62% in Scotland) has boosted the Scottish 
Government’s narrative that Scotland is, in the main, pro-Europe and implicitly in favour of freedom 
of movement. Yet, evidence suggests that opposition to immigration may be relatively high amongst 
‘the very people who feel most Scottish and are most in favour of constitutional change in Scotland’ 
(McCollum et al., 2014: 95).  
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There are currently about 238,000 EU nationals living in Scotland, representing 63% of Scotland’s 
non-British population (National Records of Scotland, 2019), where Polish nationals, at 97,000 (+/- 
12%), are the most common non-British nationality in Scotland. Nationals of EU member states are 
likely to be impacted considerably by the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union and 
the cumulative effects of a predicted recession post-Covid 19. Some of these effects are already 
manifest, such as risks to migrants’ employment and housing rights, uncertainty over their immigration 
status and welfare rights, and concerns over family reunion rights given the end of freedom of 
movement (Hepburn, 2020). While other studies (Guma and Dafydd Jones, 2019) have mainly 
documented the concerns and anxieties of adult migrants, this paper draws on findings from research 
carried out with young people aged 12-18 who arrived in the UK as migrant children from Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) after the enlargement of the European Union post-2004. The project, carried 
out between April 2016 and January 2019, covering both the Referendum and the post-Referendum 
period, explored young people’s feelings of identity and belonging in the UK and plans for future in 
the context of the Brexit negotiations (Tyrrell et al., 2019; Sime et al., 2020). The findings present the 
first analysis since the Brexit Referendum of how young EU migrants navigate multiple national 
identities and find it difficult to claim Scottishness, despite its proclaimed inclusive nature and the pro-
Europeanism which have become the cornerstone of progressive politics in Scotland. It also examines 
the extent to which these identities and nationalisms are perceived as inclusive, and also documents 
young people’s everyday struggles to assert their belonging in Scotland despite their ongoing 
racialisation (Fox et al., 2012).  
The article starts with a review of what we know from existing research on Scottish national identity 
and minority ethnic groups. The data I draw on come from a sub-sample of a bigger UK-wide cohort 
and includes 190 responses from young people living in Scotland who completed an online survey 
and eleven focus groups with 61 young people of Eastern European origin. I analyse how the 
participants engage with issues of national identity and fluidly construct their identities, depending on 
what they perceive as available and desirable identities to claim. Before I go on to discuss the findings, 
I review existing evidence on Scottishness and the research on Scottish identity carried out with 
minority groups and outline the methods of data collection and analysis.   
 
A COUNTRY FOR NEW SCOTS? SCOTTISHNESS AS POSSIBLE IDENTITY FOR MIGRANT YOUTH 
Debates on Scotland’s future relationship with the rest of UK and Europe, political attitudes and voting 
behaviours are increasingly driven by considerations of national identity and what Scottishness means 
in relation to other identities available to migrants in the UK. The upsurge of nationalist sentiment in 
Scotland and ongoing debates over its constitutional future since the Independence Referendum in 
2014 and the EU Referendum in 2016 are clearly shaping a new landscape in relation to Scotland’s 
place in Europe. Many have argued that the SNP-led government has managed to promote a more 
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progressive and inclusive, ‘civic’ nationalism (McCollum et al., 2014), with a pro-immigration stance 
that would be influencing immigration policy in case of constitutional change. Indeed, over the last 
decade, the SNP-led government has taken a positive stance on immigration, with campaigns aimed 
at attracting ‘New Scots’ to come and live in Scotland. Emejulu (2013) has argued that by constructing 
England and Englishness as ‘a repository of various negative aspects of culture, politics and society 
in Scotland’ (p44), the idea of Scottishness becomes secure and adaptable to further inclusions, while 
presented as a superior form of identity to the English one. This also means that spaces for new types 
of ethnic minorities can be created within the Scottish identity space, where ‘the Other’ is represented 
by the English and England. Scotland is thus presented as empathic to other potentially oppressed 
groups, given the history of being oppressed by an English rule. This inclusive form of civic national 
identity promoted for decades may also explain why Scotland has not seen a rise in populist, 
xenophobic politics, unlike other European countries (e.g. Austria, Hungary, Poland, Spain). 
A shared national identity is often seen as a sign of social cohesion; similarly, a feeling of being 
excluded as an individual or group can have detrimental consequences for the societies in which 
those feeling marginalised live. There is some evidence that, in Scotland, certain minority ethnic 
groups feel a sense of national identity and pride when it comes to their Scottishness (Emejulu, 2013; 
Bonino, 2015) and do not seem to experience a tension in using their self-selected hyphenated 
identities, such as Scottish-Pakistani or Scottish-Muslim. However, this identification is not 
homogenous across minority ethnic groups. While large minorities such as Pakistani Muslim, Indian 
and Other Asian show higher rates of sub-state identification in Scotland than in other nations of the 
UK, Scottish identification seems less strong among White Polish or White Other, Indian Hindus, 
Chinese, Black African Christians (Bond, 2016). Overall, among all minority groups, Scottish 
identification is much lower than among the White majority, posing under question the claims that a 
multicultural nationalist project is succeeding in Scotland. Bond’s analysis (2016), using Census 2011 
data, also showed that those who have migrated to Scotland are less likely to feel ‘Scottish’ than those 
born here and Scottishness does not necessarily emerge as an identity or as part of a hyphenated 
identity even with long-term residence. Research on census data is very useful in this sense, as it 
allows for comparisons between groups, although limitations exist. For example, the Census 2011 
included only one question on national identity and limited young migrants’ agency and voice, as all 
data on children and young people under 16 was collected by proxy, through adults. This paper aims 
thus to address the lack of data on young migrants’ sense of national identity, in the context of 
intensified debates on migration, migrants’ place in Scotland and Scotland’s potential constitutional 
change.  
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METHODOLOGY  
The study adopted a methodological design which focussed on maximising the input of young people 
in the choice of methods, data collection and dissemination activities. Drawing on the new sociology 
of childhood and youth (James and Prout, 2015), which acknowledges the centrality of young people’s 
voice in research about their lives, the methodology elicited data through the direct involvement of 
young people. Between October 2016-April 2017, we gathered the opinions and experiences of young 
people from Central and Eastern Europe who had migrated to the UK as children on a range of issues, 
including feelings of belonging, participation in communities, access to services, experiences of 
prejudice and exclusion, their relationships, well-being and plans for future.  An online survey was 
completed by over 1,100 young people. In Scotland, 190 young people took the survey, of which 45% 
were in the 12-15 age group and 55% were 16-18; respondents lived mainly in urban areas (78%). 
Only the data from this sub-sample  are used here. While the majority (72%, n=137) were born in 
Poland, there were 9 other nationalities given (Lithuanian, Latvian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Czech, 
Estonian, Hungarian, Slovakia, Ukranian). As EU nationals were exercising their freedom of 
movement in the UK, only a very small proportion (9%) had dual or triple nationality (n=14) and the 
rest retained the nationality of their country of birth. 
After the survey, between May-June 2017, we organised eleven focus groups with 61 young people 
(30 female, 31 male) in schools across Scotland and carried out in-depth case studies with 9 young 
people (6 female, 3 male) and their families. The focus groups discussed issues of identity and 
belonging in the context of Brexit, access to services and perceptions of likely impact of Brexit on their 
families. In the focus groups and family visits, we used an interactive facilitation kit (Ketso, 
www.ketso.com), which allows participants to write or draw their ideas on colour-coded cards, before 
they engage in group conversations and share their ideas under pre-established themes. In 
presenting the data, I use descriptive statics for the quantitative data and a thematic approach for the 
qualitative data. The project benefited from guidance from a Youth Advisory Group, who were involved 
from design to dissemination, including the production of an arts exhibition at Glasgow’s Tramway 
Museum. It received ethical approval from the author’s institution and ethical issues of consent, 
anonymity and right to withdraw were observed at all stages, in addition to ensuring participants were 
not at risk of harm. All participants’ names have been changed. 
FEELINGS OF (NON)BELONGING  
As this was a UK-wide study, young people were asked if they felt they belonged in the United 
Kingdom. The vast majority (87%) expressed a feeling of belonging in the UK and only 4% said that 
they ‘definitely’ did not feel that they belonged in the UK. At the same time, young people remained 
unsure whether they will be able to continue to live in the UK and 85% did not feel hopeful about 
Britain’s decision to leave the EU. Close to half (43%) said they felt ‘worried’ about their future post-
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Brexit (see Tyrrell et al., 2019). Young people were aware of the key role that the anti-immigration 
rhetoric had played in the Brexit Referendum:  
Josef: Don’t you think most of people who voted for Brexit didn't actually understand what it's 
about?  They all just thought, "we vote Brexit, we're going to get rid of all the immigrants".  
That's what they thought. 
Interviewer: So do you think that was the main reason that people voted for Brexit? 
Josef: That is the main reason.  Let's be honest. (Focus Group 4) 
 
In the same group, Josef and Marek, both Polish, talk about the risk to EU nationals’ right to remain 
in the UK post-Brexit and threats of deportation, although at the time of the interviews, EU nationals 
were exercising their freedom of movement right and were not subject to immigration controls: 
 
Josef: You just hear people saying that now Brexit's happened that you're going to get—
what's the word again?—deported back to your country and that they're happy about it. 
Interviewer: Right. 
Marek: Is it true that people who have been here for more than 3 years or something, like, 
get to, like… ‘cause apparently my friend got a letter saying he needs to leave and go back 
to his own country, ‘cause if not they would have to, you know… 
Josef: Deport him? 
Marek: Yeah, deport him. (Focus Group 4) 
 
In the online survey, young people also described incidents of cultural racism, xenophobia and micro-
aggressions they experienced mainly in school, but also in public places, which made them think they 
were not welcome in Scotland, despite their feelings of belonging here. These experiences of 
everyday individual or institutionalised forms of prejudice-based discrimination and racism went 
largely unreported and young people often brushed them off:  
I have experienced racism in school, people telling me to go back to my own country and 
telling me I don’t belong here, also people making fun of me because I’m not from here.  
Got called white trash, got excluded with other Polish friends because we aren’t Scottish etc. 
Made fun of my accent (I moved from England to Scotland).  
During a football match, a gang of Scottish guys (aged 16-18) came and assaulted my friends 
with wrenches, pipes and hammers for being Polish.  
Someone drew a Swastika on my house and wrote go back to your country and stop stealing 
jobs. (Survey respondents) 
Many of these incidents involved young people being othered through markers of difference other 
than their skin colour, such as their accent or nationality. These showed the tension young Europeans 
perceived between their sense of belonging in the UK and their experiences of victimisation. As many 
of these incidents happened in schools, young people’s sense of security and belonging to the schools 
as communities of learning and cohesion were also altered. The survey data showed that those young 
people who believed their school was supportive of Central and Eastern European young people were 
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more likely to feel a sense of belonging to the UK and were more likely to want to remain long-term, 
even after Brexit. Overall, a stronger feeling of belonging to the UK was associated with higher levels 
of satisfaction with their lives in the UK, which points to clear policy implications for ensuring that the 
narrative of welcoming Scotland is translated into inclusive practices at community level. The 
evidence suggests a disjoint between the inclusive political rhetoric and new ethnic minorities’ 
everyday experiences, reflected also in the public attitudes to migration.  
IDENTITY STRUGGLES- NAVIGATING MULTIPLE IDENTITIES 
When analysing young people’s feelings of identity and how they thought of themselves in relation to 
national identities, the identity struggles most young people were experiencing became apparent 
across all datasets. In the online survey, when asked ‘What do you feel is your national identity?’, a 
majority of young people identified first and foremost with their country of birth, although many had 
lived in the UK for many years. Out of 190 responses, just over half (53%, n=101) gave their national 
identity as that of their country of birth (or region) and about 40 per cent (n=76) gave a hyphenated 
identity. A quarter of all respondents (n=46) included ‘Scottishness’ in their hyphenated identities or 
said they felt Scottish (see Table 1), and another quarter included Britishness or Englishness as part 
of their national identity, although length of stay did not differ significantly between these three groups. 
Only 8% of all the whole sample said they had a British passport or dual nationality, including British, 
and given EU nationals were free to exercise their freedom of movement at the time of the study, 
many did not see the need to acquire British citizenship or found its associated costs (at around 
£1,330 per person) prohibitive. 
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Country of birth Single national 
identity = 
country/region of 
birth 
Hyphenated identity 
or Scottish identity 
Hyphenated British or 
English identity, only 
British, or not sure 
Poland 
(n=137) 
Polish (n=73) 
 
Polish-Scottish (n=19) 
Scottish-Polish (n=3) 
Scottish (n=3) 
 
Polish-British (n=35) 
British (n=3) 
Don’t know (n=1) 
Lithuania  
(n=13) 
Lithuanian (n=1) 
Russian (n=4) 
Lithuanian-Scottish (n=1) 
Lithuanian-Scottish-British 
(n=2) 
Scottish-Lithuanian (n=1) 
Scottish (n=2) 
Lithuanian-British (n=1) 
Lithuanian- English (n=1) 
 
Latvia 
(n=10) 
Latvian (n=4) 
European (n=1) 
Latvian-Scottish (n=3) 
Scottish (n=1) 
Latvian-British (n=1) 
 
Bulgaria (n=6) Bulgarian (n=3) Bulgarian-Scottish (n=3) 
 
 
Romania (n=6) Romanian (n=4) 
Hungarian (n=1) 
Scottish (n=1) 
 
 
Hungary (n=4) 
 
Hungarian (n=2) 
European (n=1) 
 
Hungarian-Scottish (n=1) 
 
 
Czech R (n=4) 
 
 Czech-Scottish (n=3) 
 
Czech-English (n=1) 
Estonia (n=4) Estonian (n=2) 
Russian (n=2) 
 
  
Slovakia (n=3) 
 
Slovak (n=3) 
 
  
Russia or 
Ukraine (n=3) 
 
 Scottish-Russian (n=1) 
Scottish (n=2) 
 
 
Total=190 Total= 101  
 
53% 
Total= 46 
 
24% 
Total= 43 
 
23% 
Average length 
of living in UK 
(years) 
 
8.12 8.72 
 
8.92 
Table 1. Country of birth and national identity given by participants in survey (n=190) 
When asked if they felt Scottish, British, English or European, in a subsequent ‘yes/no’ question, just 
over half said they felt Scottish (51%), and a smaller proportion said they felt British (37%) or English 
(11%). These results are comparable with data from a Scottish-born youth sample, in which 53% of 
the respondents identified as ‘Scottish, not British’ or ‘more Scottish than British’ and 39% said they 
felt ‘equally Scottish and British’ (Eichhorn et al., 2014). In many respects, this could be seen as an 
indicator of young people’s fluid identity as ‘New Scots’, given just over half of my sample said they 
felt Scottish when asked a direct question, yet less than 10% identified Scottishness as their national 
identity when asked to describe what they felt their national identity was. Combined with young 
people’s sense of belonging to the UK which was high (87%), this may suggest that young migrants 
may present a group more likely to engage with the inclusive multiculturalism project of Scotland.  
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Do you feel… Yes No Don’t know Total 
responses 
Scottish 51% (n=80) 32%(n=50)  17%(n=26) N=156 
English 11% (n=18) 77% (n=120) 12% (n=19) N=157 
British 37% (n=58) 47% (n=75) 16% (n=26) N=159 
European 90% (n=148) 4% (n=6) 7% (n=11) N=165 
Table 2. Young people’s identification with the regions of the UK and Europe  
However, in the focus groups and family case studies, young people felt they could not claim a 
Scottish identity. While they were keen to emphasise their sense of belonging in Scotland, claiming 
national identity was seen as more problematic. In addition, the threat to their freedom of movement 
post-Brexit and the risk of losing the opportunity to travel and study in Europe, made many less likely 
to see themselves as committing to remain in Scotland long-term and hence less likely to claim 
Scottishness: 
Brexit has made me question my place in this country, and whether I have a future here (which 
I most definitely do want). Although being Polish is a big part of my identity, I don't feel that I 
ever want to permanently live there again. In fact, I can't picture myself living permanently 
anywhere, which is probably caused by moving to and from Scotland more than once- I have 
a very unclear and distorted sense of identity and belonging. (Survey respondent, Female, 17, 
Polish) 
I feel like this is my home, but I'm worried that I won't be able to go freely to my birth country, 
I plan on finishing my education and travel Europe and I think it's gonna be more difficult now. 
I would like to live in the U.K. or Canada in the future. (Survey respondent, Female, 17, Polish) 
Many felt they could never claim to be Scottish, no matter how long they had lived in the UK and that 
any claims to Scottishness would be denied to them by their Scottish-born friends or neighbours, 
because of markers of difference, such as their accent or them not born in Scotland. They seemed 
clear that a Scottish identity was not available and length of residence would not make a difference. 
These young people felt that one’s place of birth and citizenship ties one to their nationality and 
remains forever part of their national identity: 
Interviewer: When you think about your nationality, do you think of yourself, like, would you 
say "I'm Scottish"?  Would you say "I'm British"?  Would you say "I'm European"?  Would 
you say "I'm Polish"? 
Josef: I'm Polish. 
Marek: We are Polish. 
Interviewer: Polish, yeah.  Joanna? 
Joanna: Polish. 
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Interviewer: Or would you ever say Polish-Scottish? 
Joannna: No. 
Interviewer: Not really?  Always Polish. 
Marek: No matter what, I'm still Polish.  I've been born in Poland and brought up in Poland. 
Josef: My parents are Polish, so I'm Polish. (Focus group) 
 
In a minority of cases, young people felt that the rapid increase in immigration was a threat to Britain’s 
identity and that made it more difficult for anyone, including British nationals, to maintain a sense of 
national identity: 
If I could have voted at the time [in the Brexit Referendum], I would have voted Leave. I could 
never feel fully British or Scottish because your nationality is in your blood, not in the language 
you speak - although Europeans can mix pretty well. Furthermore, the amount of immigration 
to the United Kingdom is insane, I can't imagine how anyone could feel a sense of nationality 
here - which, I believe, is crucial for a peoples' survival - because it's been diluted so heavily 
that being British has no meaning anymore. (Survey Respondent, Male, 18, Polish) 
In summary, although some of the young people reported a hyphenated identity in the survey (Polish-
Scottish, Scottish-Lithuanian, Lithuanian-Scottish-British etc.), the majority did not think they could 
reasonably and confidently claim a Scottish or British identity and seemed to experience pressure 
mainly from their peers, but also reflecting media discourses on nationalism and who gets to belong. 
This is in contrast with findings from Emejulu’s study (2013) and others with Scottish Pakistani groups, 
where adults who were either born in Pakistan and had migrated to Scotland or were born in Scotland 
to Pakistani families seemed to experience no tension in relation to claiming a hyphenated identity 
(‘Scottish-Pakistani or ‘Scottish-Muslim’). Hussain and Miller (2006) argued that because Scottish 
Pakistani’s primary identity is cultural, the adoption of Scottishness in their ethnic identity is more 
salient. Scottish identification is less strong among other ethno-religious groups, including Polish 
(Bond, 2016). This may suggest that a Scottish identity is not perceived as straightforwardly inclusive 
by all minority groups, despite evidence of a politics of multicultural nationalism in Scotland (Hussain 
and Miller 2006, Hunter and Meer, 2018). 
The European identity was, by contrast, perceived as more accessible, through young people’s 
citizenship and membership of the EU. In the sample, 90% of the respondents in Scotland said they 
felt European (this was 93% for the overall UK sample), clearly indicating the saliency of a European 
identity as more available and uncontested.  This finding shows that participants clearly felt a strong 
sense of connection and belonging to Europe, with many saying that a European identity will always 
be part of who they are and how they see their place in the world. For the majority, feeling European 
and also having a sense of belonging to the UK and Scotland were entirely compatible: 
I feel very connected to Europe and a European culture. There has been some concern 
regarding whether I want to stay in this country in the future due to the political changes 
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happening in the UK. I am considering moving to the EU after finishing university, despite the 
fact I enjoy living in this country. (Survey respondent, Male, 18, Latvia) 
When asked about a sense of belonging to their local neighbourhood, only 13% said that they ‘always’ 
felt they belonged in their local neighbourhood, and 30% said that they ‘mostly’ did. In addition, 1 in 5 
said that they ‘never’ or ‘mostly’ felt that they did not belong. The sense of not belonging to their 
neighbourhoods was strongly linked to young people’s perceptions of their neighbours as being 
prejudiced against Eastern European migrants or not. This suggests that developing a sense of local 
neighbourhood belonging has been challenging for some of the young Europeans, perhaps more so 
than developing a feeling of belonging to Britain.  
Some of the young people commented that they had experienced increased racism and xenophobia 
in their neighbourhoods since the Brexit Referendum and that this had changed the way they felt 
about their areas. This can be a factor in young people’s readiness to adopt a Scottish identity, if 
perceptions at local of attitudes to ‘New Scots’ are negative.  Even among young people who moved 
to Scotland as children, the feeling of national belonging appeared to have been disrupted by Britain’s 
decision to leave the EU. While those living in Scotland were more likely to say ‘they felt Scottish’ than 
those in England saying they ‘felt English’, overall, young people felt that Brexit was a rejection of 
their plans to settle and make a home in Scotland. For some, this was also a reason to express views 
in favour of Scotland’s plans to become independent and rejoin the European Union: 
I would like Scotland to leave the U.K., and I'd like it to stay a part of the European Union. 
Although I don't think my opinion is as valid as someone who plans to stay in Scotland or the 
UK since I plan to travel and explore where else I could end up living, I'm thinking I'll one day 
move to Scandinavia or New Zealand. (Survey Respondent, Female, 17, Czech) 
I feel like I belong as a part of Scotland, but I don't feel part of Britain as a whole. Scotland has 
been extremely welcoming and accepting, but English and immigrants of other nationalities 
have been much more intolerant as well as the younger generations in Scotland. I plan to 
study abroad, but will most likely have to study in Scotland to avoid tuition fees, so with Brexit 
looming I'm a bit apprehensive as to how it will affect my Higher Education. (Survey 
Respondent, Female, 15, Latvian-Scottish) 
Young people talked about how they incorporated Scottish cuisine, cultures and traditions into their 
family life and their everyday practices. They were keen to talk about the aspects of the Scottish 
culture their families embraced and loved, such as customs and traditions, food and drink, and places 
they loved to visit around Scotland. These traditions had been adopted by families over years and 
were often observed in parallel with customs and traditions families maintained from their country of 
migration.  
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Vladislaw: We buy just British products, but we prepare [the food] in Polish ways.  And also 
we have like British, Scottish meals, like haggis and the tatties.  And em, sometimes for 
breakfast we have like Lorne sausage.  
 
Amelia My mum, she loves nature, she loves Scotland- she likes the culture and the 
history and the music.  
Interviewer:  What is it about the Scottish culture and history that you like? 
Amelia: Like the kinda traditional clothes and stuff, like you know like Caledonian, you 
know how they do the drums and that kinda music. My mum she likes...the 
bagpipes. 
 
 
However, this appeared to be an intermittent, selective engagement with Scottishness and aspects 
of the Scottish culture, which many felt they should respect and be aware of given they were now 
living in Scotland. This did not mean that they could see themselves as adopting or developing a 
hyphenated ethnic identity in time, although the majority anticipated they were likely to remain in 
Scotland in the future. While the devolved Scottish government has pursued over the last decade a 
cultural and institutional context which is pro-immigration and inclusive, there are aspects of young 
people’s everyday life that seem to make them less likely than others, more established minorities to 
adopt Scottishness as part of their identity. One potential explanation is that young people consistently 
reported incidents of discrimination and racism, with over two thirds of the survey sample (70%) saying 
they had been victims of occasional or regular prejudice-based bullying and discrimination, mainly in 
schools, but also in their local communities.   
Nadia: There was a lot of racism.  But now, like, it’s kind of gone now.  And I don’t 
really pay attention to it, cause I think it’s kind of stupid. 
Sylvia:  Yeah, you kind of learn more as time goes on. 
Denis:  Yeah, everyone’s used to you by now. (Focus group) 
While 65% of the young people said they were satisfied with their school and felt schools were ‘fairly’ 
or ‘very’ supportive of Eastern Europeans, many commented on how schools made regular attempts 
to constrain young people’s cultural and ethnic identities, by denying markers of identities other than 
Scottish in the school. 
Sylvia: Yeah, ‘cause the teachers are saying, like, in class that we're not supposed to 
speak in our own language.  Cause they would think - 
Donna: It was me and my friend, we were talking the language in classes and they 
said, like a teacher came up to us and said that we can't do that cause other 
people will think that we're talking about them… 
Amelie: Yeah, yeah. 
Nadia:  Yeah, we got into trouble for speaking in Polish in primary. 
Sylvia:  And we had to eat lunch in separate rooms. 
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Nadia: Like, we weren't allowed to… we got, like, separated completely because we 
were speaking in, like, our native language. (Focus Group) 
 
The evidence presented suggests that some opportunities exist for new migrants to connect with the 
identity of Scottishness in time, especially when they have moved to Scotland from a young age. 
However, everyday practices of exclusion and micro-aggressions, as well as racist and xenophobic 
incidents, are threating the development of a Scottish or blended national identity for this group. As 
other research on minorities and national identity has demonstrated (Emejulu, 2013; Bonino, 2015), 
a sense of national identity and feelings of belonging to a place are closely connected. The narrative 
of a Scottish exceptionalism needs to be qualified, in light of evidence presented here (see also 
Davidson et al., 2018) that Scotland does not have a problem with racism and anti-immigration 
feelings. Although most young people feel that a sense of Scottishness, European and Eastern 
European identities can be negotiated without significant tension, it appears that the extent to which 
they are able to develop a sense Scottishness and a Scottish identity depends on several factors. 
These include feelings of belonging to their schools and communities, perceptions of attitudes from 
locals and security over their long-term residence. In the context of Brexit, a European identity 
becomes more salient and stable, and as young people find themselves uncertain about their rights 
to remain in Britain, they imagine their future open in terms of moving elsewhere (see Sime et al., 
2020). This process of belonging and identifying with the nation is made more difficult by young 
people’s everyday experiences of being othered, racism and xenophobia and the lack of political 
representation, which was seen by many as one of the reasons why the Brexit process and its 
aftermath was a significant risk to EU nationals’ rights and security.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have aimed to provide an analysis of the processes of identity negotiation young 
Eastern Europeans are going through in the context of Brexit, how they understand their multiple 
identities and the important role their sense of belonging plays in defining their national identities. 
Young EU-born nationals settled in Scotland feel less able to make claims to a Scottish identity, 
despite a strong sense of belonging and long-term residence, while their sense of a European identity 
is much stronger. In the context of Brexit, this may be due to a perception of a European identity as 
more inclusive and readily available to them, given current anti-immigration discourses in Britain, 
ongoing debates over national identity in Scotland and migrants’ everyday experiences of 
marginalisation. Many young people feel that their sense of belonging to Scotland and the rest of the 
UK, and their future life plans, were now uncertain because of Brexit. Young Eastern Europeans who 
experience racism are less likely to feel a strong sense of belonging to their new country of residence 
and their local neighbourhood. The majority of the young people in the survey and focus groups said 
they had experienced racism, xenophobia and prejudice-based bullying or harassment and this posed 
a tension between their public selves, where young people did not feel they could have a claim to 
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Scottishness, and the private, personal selves, where more than half said they felt Scottish. 
Experiencing racism also appeared to lower young people’s feelings of satisfaction with their life in 
the UK and was likely to make some think about future destinations where they could move to after 
finishing school or university.  
While many young people expressed a strong sense of belonging to Scotland and the UK as a whole, 
access to a Scottish national identity seems to be restricted and often denied for new migrants. In the 
context of Brexit, this poses a challenge for young migrants, why may review their plans to remain in 
Scotland long-term if their rights change. This is despite considerable efforts from Scotland’s devolved 
government to promote an inclusive Scottish national identity and present a more pro-European and 
pro-immigration nationalism in Scotland. It remains to be seen how continued plans to push for 
constitutional change and devolved immigration powers are harmonised in the context of ongoing 
exclusionary practices in communities and anti-immigration views often expressed by many of those 
most committed to the independence project. This may see the SNP-led Government faced with a 
significant political challenge, as they aim to appeal to both independence-favouring Scots resistant 
to immigration and the ‘New Scots’ -migrants they need to attract to secure Scotland’s prosperity, 
economy and tackle its demographic challenge.  
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